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of their friends.1 Henry Gondorff and Johnny Hooker team up to pull off 
an elaborate scheme—a “sting”—on Doyle Lonnegan. Gondorff has been in 
the con business a long time; Hooker is a rookie who wants to advance in 
it. You might say that Gondorff is the supervisor, and Hooker is his protégé. 
The scheme they concoct requires that Hooker pose as someone he is not. He 
must win Lonnegan’s con! dence so that the mobster will follow Hooker’s 
advice and wager a signi! cant sum of money on a horse race, money that 
the pair will eventually take. Gondorff and Hooker set up a fake gambling 
parlor. Hooker pretends to Lonnegan that he has an accomplice who can 
delay the race announcements just long enough to know which horse won 
before a bet is placed. Thus Lonnegan will be able to bet on a sure winner, all 
the while unaware that the entire operation is a charade.
How does Lonnegan, an otherwise ruthless and untrusting man, come 
to believe what Hooker is telling him and agree to follow his lead? Hooker 
poses as one of Gondorff’s protégés who holds a grudge and wants to get 
back at Gondorff by taking a lot of money off of him. He spins a story about 
past mistreatment. Lonnegan is inclined to trust Hooker’s story because he 
himself holds a grudge against Gondorff for besting him at a high stakes card 
game. He therefore trusts Hooker in the way that people do who share mutual 
enemies. It is not so much trust in Hooker that motivates Lonnegan as it is his 
intense and insatiable desire for revenge.
Lonnegan does insist, however, upon testing out the “con” Hooker 
wants him to help pull on Gondorff. He agrees to place an initial bet for a 
small amount of money just to see that the system works. He bets on the horse 
Hooker tells him to bet on, and it wins, and Lonnegan is satis! ed. Just to be 
thoroughly assured that Hooker can be held accountable, however, Lonnegan 
demands to meet Hooker’s accomplice. Hooker arranges for Lonnegan to 
meet the man who supposedly has insider knowledge of the races. This meet-
ing, too, of course, is a charade, but Lonnegan believes what he sees and con-
cludes that he has satisfactorily checked out the whole operation. He agrees 
to place half a million dollars on the next horse race in order to take Gondorff 
for everything he’s got. Hooker and Gondorff have successfully conned their 
mark. Shortly after handing over the money for his bet, the gambling parlor is 
raided by friends of Gondorff and Hooker pretending to be police, and Lon-
negan is hustled out of the place without being able to collect his money back.
Doyle Lonnegan is a character who places trust where he should not. His 
" aw is not simply that he is too trusting and, therefore, gets himself duped. 




What is the relationship between trust and accountability? The answer is not 
as straightforward as might commonly be assumed. In the supervisory rela-
tionship, it is not enough that supervisors and supervisees prove themselves 
trustworthy by demonstrating their accountability to each other. Trust is 
both more complicated and more interesting than that. Trust between two 
people is essentially a relationship. It grows and deepens through the will-
ingness of both to take risks and make themselves vulnerable to each other. 
Trust involves risk because both open themselves to outcomes that neither 
can predict with certainty. Accountability, by contrast, is the obligation to 
provide a reckoning of one’s actions to another. It contributes to trust but 
does not tell the whole story.
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Let me begin by drawing upon a narrative that may be familiar to many 
readers but may never have been associated with supervision, trust, or ac-
countability. In the 1973 ! lm The Sting, two con artists wish to play a con-
! dence game on a notorious crime boss who recently ordered a hit on one 
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man. Hooker, however, lies to him. Word has spread that someone passed 
counterfeit bills off to the police to get out of a scrape; that was Hooker. Gon-
dorff wants to be sure that he hasn’t teamed up with a bad risk, so he asks 
Hooker about the counterfeiting. Hooker denies it. A bit later, Hooker discov-
ers that someone, presumably from Lonnegan’s mob, is tailing him. Again 
he fails to share this information with Gondorff, even when pressed. In other 
words, despite having been accepted and entrusted by the very mentor he 
wanted to study under, Hooker consistently proves himself to be an untrust-
worthy student. He is one of those students who is smart, highly capable, and 
a good learner, but also cocky, irresponsible, and evasive. He doesn’t yet know 
what it really means to work as a team in the con business. Does Gondorff re-
alize this? Does he suspect that Hooker may be holding out on him? Or has 
he naively agreed to mentor someone he should never have entrusted with so 
much responsibility?
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It turns out that Gondorff has hedged his bets about Hooker all along. A wise 
mentor, he trusts but is not overly trusting. He puts a safety net in place. Un-
beknownst to Hooker, he assigns a colleague to follow him and make sure 
the young man remains unscathed. He admonishes Hooker when the truth 
about the counterfeiting and the tail on him come out. “What else haven’t 
you been telling me? … You just won’t learn, will you? I’m teaching you 
things maybe ! ve people know.” He even issues a direct lesson to his stu-
dent about trust relationships: “You can’t play your friends like marks.” As a 
supervisor, Gondorff grants a great deal of responsibility to Hooker—nearly 
enough for Hooker to ruin the whole plan if he were rash enough to do so. 
Yet all the while, Gondorff works to ensure Hooker’s safety and the safety of 
the whole operation. Gondorff effectively creates the conditions necessary 
for Hooker to grow into trustworthiness. One glance between them toward 
the end of the ! lm tells it all: when Hooker shows up with Lonnegan at 
the betting place unscathed, having realized that his mentor protected him, 
there is obvious relief on Gondorff’s face and gratitude on Hooker’s.
The Sting, a ! lm whose very theme is con! dence, teaches us a lot about 
trust. The relationship between Gondorff and Hooker shows us what real 
trust is like: We do not always have the luxury of choosing to trust only those 
people who have in some prior way already proven themselves to us. We are 
not always given partners who can demonstrate with clarity the qualities of 
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lies in the fact that he entrusts himself to a scheme whose players he does not 
take the time to get to know. In the ! lm, he never really establishes a relation-
ship with Hooker. Instead, he focuses on the system Hooker presents and its 
operations. Satis! ed that everything seems to work as it is supposed to, he 
invests in the betting scheme. Lonnegan places his trust in procedures rather 
than people.
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In contrast, the ! lm offers a very different portrayal of Gondorff’s and 
Hooker’s evolving trust relationship. Gondorff has not met Hooker before 
they join forces to pull off the con on Lonnegan. He takes his time getting 
to know the rookie. Hooker had been mentored by Luther, the grifter who 
was killed. This relationship is his initial “in” with Gondorff. When Hooker 
shows up at Gondorff’s doorstep eager to meet and team up with the leg-
endary con artist about whom he has heard so much, he doesn’t make it past 
Gondorff’s partner until he offers up Luther’s name. “Are you Hooker?” she 
asks, “Why didn’t you say so?” Credentials are often important to the es-
tablishment of trust because people want to know that the other is familiar, 
known by someone they also know.
But credentials are not enough. Hooker may know the right people and 
come bearing a positive reputation, but these are just his ticket in the door. 
Unlike Lonnegan, Gondorff is more careful about who he agrees to team up 
with. Throughout their initial meeting (throughout which, incidentally, Gon-
dorff is shaking off a hangover from the night before), the older man bides his 
time and clearly sizes the youngster up. He teases the overeager Hooker, who 
wants to get started right away before the pair even ! gures out whether they 
are well suited to work together. He quizzes Hooker, asking him how much 
he knows about Lonnegan. Hooker has to give a little recital of Lonnegan’s re-
cord in the mob before Gondorff is satis! ed that he knows enough about the 
man they are up against to be a credible partner. He also assesses Hooker’s 
seriousness and commitment to the task that lies ahead. He tries to ! gure out 
whether the younger man’s goals are realistic or whether he will blow the job 
by pressing for more gain and glory than they can reasonably expect. “Don’t 
be coming back afterward saying it isn’t enough because it’s all we’re gonna 
get.”
Gondorff eventually approves Hooker and agrees to teach him how to 
pull off the big con. Immediately after, he becomes Gondorff’s right-hand 
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assurance that the risk will prove worthwhile. At ! rst tentative with each 
other, engaging in a sort of dance, they learn to “read” each other. That is, 
they learn where the other’s strengths and weaknesses lie and how much 
they can expect of the other. They are vulnerable—in this case, the mentor 
even more than the protégé—and this helps their mutual trust to grow. They 
learn that it is all right to risk honesty and that it is also acceptable to hedge 
a bit against the other’s potential dishonesty, just in case. They show us what 
the lived experience of trust is like: trusting another person is a complex mix 
of caution, calculation, and stepping out in faith. There are some things you 
want to know about the other person right from the start. Can anyone else 
I know vouch for him? Does she have a record of coming through for oth-
ers? Does he genuinely appreciate what is at stake in my trusting him and 
in him trusting me? But there are other things you can never know. You do 
not know whether greed might get the better of the other person. You can-
not prevent the other person from listening to the counsel of third parties 
and even disregarding you at times. You cannot be sure she will not make 
a decision you dislike. But you have to entrust yourself anyway. You wager 
that, even if he surprises you, he will do so because he has your best interest 
at heart. This is what it means to trust someone after all and not merely to 
count on them to come through precisely the way you stipulated.
Is this not how many trust relationships, including supervisory relation-
ships, develop? When we trust, we yield a part of ourselves to another person. 
We give the person something we care about for her safekeeping. We hope it 
will remain safe in her hands, but we also assume she will take care of it the 
best way she knows how. Simply put, trust involves allowing for discretion. 
We allow the people we trust to make decisions about the well-being of the 
things with which we entrust them. We trust them to exercise good judgment 
in these decisions. The reality of genuine trust is that usually the end is open; 
part of what we are putting our faith in is the other’s ability to act in ways we 
cannot fully predict. Sometimes that might mean acting in ways we did not 
expect and could not stipulate ahead of time. The most trustworthy people 
may even surprise.
The most trusting supervisors do not merely look to see that their stu-
dents did what they said they would do. Supervisors who place the most 
trust in their students are ones who are open to outcomes they may not have 
expected. They may even hope that their students will break with procedure 
and come up with something even better than expected. This openness, so in-
eradicable in real trust, is the reason I argue that trust and accountability are 
honesty, ! delity, and responsibility that make up the trustworthiness we hope 
they possess. We are not always provided a detailed accounting of their his-
tory. More realistically, we have to accept people as they are, with all their mix 
of virtues and vices and a track record that may be checkered. We have to take 
a risk with them, extending perhaps more responsibility than they are ready 
for, but judging that risk to be acceptable. Trusting someone is like going out 
on a limb. You cannot know with absolute certainty how things will turn out, 
but you wager some of your security in exchange for the payoff that a closer 
relationship will bring.
For his part, Johnny Hooker has to learn to trust Henry Gondorff as 
well. Gondorff does not appear at ! rst glance, or even second glance, to be 
someone who makes a trustworthy mentor. Not only is he passed out on the 
" oor next to his bed when Hooker ! rst encounters him, but it comes out that 
the reason he has been out of the business for so long is that he blew it on a 
big job. “Don’t kid yourself, friend, I still know how,” he maintains, but his 
current position managing a shabby amusement park hardly conveys con! -
dence. Only through little hints and exchanges does Hooker slowly learn that, 
despite all appearances, Gondorff is still a capable operator who can teach 
him things. And the lessons are not what he expects at !rst. Hooker is caught 
off guard when Gondorff guesses that one of Lonnegan’s men may be tailing 
him. “I didn’t see anyone,” Hooker protests, to which Gondorff replies, “You 
never do, kid.” At one point in their conversation, Hooker realizes that Gon-
dorff feels apprehensive toward the job they are about to undertake. “You’re 
afraid of [Lonnegan], aren’t you?” Hooker says with dismay. But Gondorff 
simply concurs, “Right down to my socks, buddy,” as if to say that self-as-
surance does not eliminate all fear, and that a little fear in a professional may 
even be a salutary thing. As Hooker continues to try to minimize the threat 
Lonnegan poses, saying with bluster that “He’s not as tough as he thinks,” 
Gondorff calmly replies, “Neither are we.” Gondorff is teaching Hooker hu-
mility. He is also teaching his student that appearances can be deceiving and 
that it is possible to place trust in someone who is imperfect and has failed in 
the past. Those who at ! rst seem the most unlikely of mentors because of their 
" aws and vulnerability may turn out to be the very ones who are safe to trust.
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Gondorff and Hooker become mentor and protégé because they are willing 
to risk being in relationship with each other even before they have complete 
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tions for failure…and by redress for those who are let down…Systems of 
accountability are seen as ensuring that institutional and professional ac-
tion meets acceptable standards.2
In contrast to today’s stricter, stronger, formal systems of accountability, in-
terpersonal trust may seem hopelessly quaint. Even worse, talk about trust 
may sound to some like advocacy for the paternalism of the past. In an ear-
lier era, when we could not keep tabs on everything professionals were up 
to, we simply trusted in the persons themselves. We assumed that “father 
knew best” and would operate with our best interests in mind. This way 
of deciding whom to trust appeared to work, at least for a while, and fore-
stalled the crisis of trust.
Accountability as a “Second Order Obligation”
There are two problems with equating trust with paternalism and trustwor-
thiness with accountability. First, trust does not have to be bestowed blindly. 
There are smarter and dumber forms of trust, and it is important to learn to 
distinguish between them. I and others are not advocating a return to the 
unintelligent or blind placing of trust in practitioners qua practitioners. A 
full discussion of smart trust is beyond the scope of this article, but there are 
ways to learn to practice it.3 Second, it is false to assume that accountability 
is preferable to trust just because it reveals more and seems to provide more 
evidence of assurance. Accountability is really only trust one step removed. 
Let me explain.
Accountability means that I am entrusted with a responsibility for which 
I have to give an account. Anybody who is held accountable for their practice 
has, in effect, a dual obligation. Their ! rst obligation is a direct one; they must 
answer directly to the people they serve or to their jobs. A nurse, for example, 
is obliged to care for his patients in a competent manner; a student is obliged 
to study her course material. At the same time, however, they have an obliga-
tion to provide an accounting of how they have met their responsibilities. The 
nurse does not just provide care but must also account for his competent car-
ing. He answers to someone else, by ! lling out a chart or making a report to a 
supervisor. The student must not only learn the material but also demonstrate 
what she has learned. She takes tests and submits work for evaluation. She is 
thereby answerable both to herself and to her teacher. Almost everyone em-
ployed or taught or supervised has this dual set of obligations. 
Another way of saying this is that accountability is always a “second or-
der obligation.”4 The ! rst order obligation is to do the job; the second order 
obligation is to show that the job was done. Manson and O’Neill outline this 
not the same thing. When we trust others, we do not do so only because their 
performance conforms to what was promised. “Trustworthy” has become 
so synonymous with “faithful” that we forget that it does not merely mean 
having a record of discharging responsibilities consistently. In other words, a 
trustworthy person is not just someone who can produce a faithful accounting 
that passes inspection.
With respect to students under our supervision, we are not simply hop-
ing that they will produce a faithful reckoning of their responsibilities—al-
though this is understandably desirable, especially at the beginning of a su-
pervisory relationship. The behaviors that produce a good accounting are 
important. We certainly do not wish for the opposite, that is, for a student 
who is inconsistent, quirky, and unreliable. But we also wish to be able to give 
our most trusted students discretion with respect to their duties. We want to 
be able to hand them something and see where they go with it. For in those 
cases, we are entrusting ourselves to them, not to the practices and procedures 
laid out before them.
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Trust—or, more precisely, a lack of trust—is a topic of widespread conversa-
tion these days among those who worry about institutions and their leaders. 
Many bemoan its seeming decline among today’s practitioners. A common 
response to the apparent crisis in trust is to put increased effort into trying 
to make practitioners, and those who would become the next generation of 
practitioners, more trustworthy. Regulatory schemes, assessment plans, and 
third-party audits proliferate. Greater trustworthiness is widely assumed to 
be secured through greater accountability. If we could only keep better tabs 
on what people are doing in their work, the thinking goes, then we would 
be assured in placing our trust in them. So accountants are subject to more 
audits, health care providers to more documentation, ministers to more safe 
church rules, and teachers and students to more assessments, to name just 
a few examples of the proliferating new forms of accountability. As British 
philosophers Neil Manson and Onora O’Neill write:
in place of trust [skeptics] look for stronger forms of accountability. In 
effect they concentrate on improving trustworthiness, and suggest that 
we can forget about trust. The currently favoured methods for improving 
trustworthiness advocate stricter and stronger systems of accountability 
that clarify powers, obligations and rights, imposed by formal contracts 
and codes, backed by monitoring and inspection of performance, by sanc-
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have probably all felt at one time or other the pressure to make sure our prac-
tice looks good and places well within its respective scoring system. Under 
this sort of pressure, we can start making our practice conform to whatever 
the scoring standards are. Practice can actually ironically begin to suffer as 
practitioners strive to make it ever more presentable to those holding them 
accountable.
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Let us turn our perspective, however, to those who have to decide whether 
to trust us. Will they be able to make this decision simply by asking for a 
better accounting of our practice? Is accountability the same as trust? Does it 
replace the need for trust? If the structure I have outlined for accountability 
is accurate, our answer must be: accountability cannot necessarily replace 
trust. If accountability is always second order, then so too is the trust that ac-
countability generates. If someone trusts me on the basis of the accounting I 
have been able to provide, then properly speaking, they do not trust me, but 
rather the party holding me to account. In the terms used above, if what B 
wants is not just X service but also assurance that A has done X well, then B 
is not only trusting A but also trusting that C will hold A responsible. Some-
times B wants the assurance as much as the service. B trusts the account of 
A’s practice, not really the practice itself. In fact, properly speaking, B trusts 
the method or procedure C uses to evaluate the account of A’s work.
Let us take an example from the world of ! nancial services. If I know 
little about investments but have just sold my house and have a sum of money 
to invest in a retirement account, I must choose a person or organization that 
knows something about long-term investing to entrust my money to. I can 
study the track record and past performance of the organization by reading 
their materials and talking to others who have invested with them. But in or-
der to trust that the record is accurate and the materials authentic, chances are 
I rely heavily on the fact that the organization gets audited on a regular basis 
by independent auditors. My assurance, in other words, really comes from 
another party whom I trust as a source of second-order information. 
Or take the ministry. Members of a search committee hoping to select 
someone good to be the church’s next minister probably interview their can-
didates directly. But they also trust in the ecclesiastical body charged with 
endorsing ministers, including their candidates. If a candidate were to have a 
history of misconduct, the search committee would hope that such informa-
multi-step structure of accountability (expressed in the sort of language with 
which philosophers are fond): “X ought to be done by A; B has a right to X be-
ing done by A; A has a further obligation to render an account of success or 
failure in doing X to C.”5 So, for example, “Pastoral care ought to be provided 
by Chaplain A; Patient B has a right to pastoral care being provided by Chap-
lain A; Chaplain A has a further obligation to render an account of her success 
or failure in providing pastoral care to Supervisor C.” Both obligations are 
important. Primary obligations can never, of course, be neglected, as they are 
primary. But secondary obligations are also important, and increasingly so in 
this era of heightened emphasis on accountability.
Dual Obligations
In a typical structure of accountability, the obligation to account for one’s 
work is often rendered to a third party rather than back to the person in the 
primary relationship. Although the nurse and his patient probably have a 
pretty good idea about what competent caring is, they do not get to de! ne 
it all by themselves. The nurse is accountable to a nursing supervisor who 
has set standards for the patient’s competent care. As for the student, she 
may well have established her own internalized criteria for what constitutes 
good learning, but she also must demonstrate what she has learned to the 
person who designed the syllabus and set its goals. In chaplaincy training 
programs, chaplains in training make verbatim reports to their groups and 
their supervisors, who assess the nature and quality of their patient interac-
tions. In other words, a third party has usually set standards to which we are 
held accountable. This third party (“C” in Hanson and O’Neill’s terms) is, in 
turn, responsible for holding us accountable. And, I should say, in the case 
of misconduct, third parties also apply sanctions and a means of redress for 
those who are harmed.
Tensions can arise when those entrusted to do good work have to bal-
ance these dual obligations. Under pressure to provide an accounting of their 
work, for example, they may neglect their primary obligation in favor of tak-
ing the time to ful! ll their secondary obligation. Like teachers who learn to 
“teach to the test” in order to produce high test scores and thereby show their 
superiors they are effective teachers, the focus on rendering an accounting 
of practice can overtake practice itself. Good work can become neglected in 
the effort to demonstrate good work. The stronger and stricter our systems 
of accountability become, the greater becomes the danger that we feel more 
obligated to the parties holding us accountable than to those we serve. We 
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scheme in the ! lm is an extreme example of a practice made to look good 
when it was not good at all. The “practitioner” totally fabricated the results 
of his practice, but he answered to what was asked of him. The problem 
was that Lonnegan asked the wrong things of him. Therefore, Lonnegan’s 
approach is an extreme example of holding someone accountable without 
trusting them. In other words, he attempted to substitute accountability for 
trust.
In the end, there is no substitute for trust. Accountability is important be-
cause it gives us much-needed evidence of other people’s reliability, which is 
especially valuable in situations where we cannot establish primary relation-
ships with them. But ! rst-order interpersonal trust will always be important 
too. As the ! lm’s central relationship between Gondorff and Hooker shows, 
trust is not necessarily easy, but it proves sturdier in the end and even more 
fruitful. Hopefully we have not yet considered it obsolete in our own practices 
of ministerial formation and supervision.
NOTES
1. The Sting. 1973. Directed by George Roy Hill. Zanuck/Brown Productions and Univ-
er-sal Pictures. The point of using this ! lm is not to recommend the con business, but 
to re" ect on the trust relationships it depicts.
2. Neil C. Manson and Onora O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 162–3. See chapter 7, “Trust, Accountability, and 
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tion would have been discovered, ! led somewhere, and passed on as neces-
sary. They hope not to have to place con! dence in the candidate alone but also 
in the processes by which candidates are vetted. As Manson and O’Neill put 
it: “Those who rely on systems of accountability in effect place their trust in 
second-order systems for controlling and securing the reliable performance of 
primary tasks, and in those who devise and revise such systems of account-
ability.”6 But this is not really replacing trust. It is simply placing trust at the 
next level. “Pushing trust one stage, or several stages, back does not eliminate 
the need to place or refuse trust, and to do so intelligently.”7
Therefore accountability is one part of trust but not a substitute for it. 
Systems put into place for accountability in various practices and professions 
give us a lot of information, but we can never eliminate the need for interper-
sonal trust when we rely on them. In the case of my investment, I simply be-
stow trust in the auditors in addition to the investors themselves. In the case 
of the search committee members, they not only have to trust their candidate 
but also the diocese or presbytery or other ecclesial body and in that body’s 
vigilance in tracking cases of misconduct and sharing information appropri-
ately. (The committee may also legitimately hope that misconduct has been 
adequately prevented through effective systems of ministerial formation and 
training.) Good systems for accountability do provide a lot of evidence upon 
which we can base decisions about whom to trust, but it is still the case that 
other human beings produce that evidence and design the ways by which it 
gets collected. In short, there will always remain multiple people we have to 
trust.
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Doyle Lonnegan did not just trust the wrong people; he failed to trust peo-
ple. Instead, he trusted the procedure that had been set in place to provide 
an accounting of the horse race betting operation. In effect, he “audited” the 
operation by looking at a sample of it. He placed a test bet and got a satis-
factory result, one that squared with what he had expected. The practice in 
question appeared to do what it said it would, and therefore he concluded 
that Hooker was someone who could be held accountable. This gave Lon-
negan the con! dence to trust Hooker and thereby go on to bet an even big-
ger sum. The problem was that there was no true relationship between the 
reliability of the practice and the trustworthiness of the practitioner. Hook-
er was fully accountable but not at all trustworthy! The fake horse racing 
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